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Abstract—Smart contracts are programs running on top of
blockchain platforms. They interact with each other through
well-defined interfaces to perform financial transactions in a
distributed system with no trusted third parties. But these
interfaces also provide a favorable setting for attackers, who
can exploit security vulnerabilities in smart contracts to achieve
financial gain.
This paper presents SMARTSCOPY, a system for automatic
synthesis of adversarial contracts that identify and exploit
vulnerabilities in a victim smart contract. Our tool explores
the space of attack programs based on the Application Binary
Interface (ABI) specification of a victim smart contract in
the Ethereum ecosystem. To make the synthesis tractable, we
introduce summary-based symbolic evaluation, which significantly
reduces the number of instructions that our synthesizer needs
to evaluate symbolically, without compromising the precision
of the vulnerability query. Building on the summary-based
symbolic evaluation, SMARTSCOPY further introduces a novel
approach for partitioning the synthesis search space for parallel
exploration, as well as a lightweight deduction technique that
can prune infeasible candidates earlier. We encoded common
vulnerabilities of smart contracts in our query language, and
evaluated SMARTSCOPY on the entire data set from etherscan
with >25K smart contracts. Our experiments demonstrate the
benefits of summary-based symbolic evaluation and show that
SMARTSCOPY outperforms two state-of-the-art smart contracts
analyzers, OYENTE and CONTRACTFUZZER, in terms of running
time, precision, and soundness. Furthermore, running on recent
popular smart contracts, SMARTSCOPY uncovers 20 vulnerable
smart contracts that contain the recent BatchOverflow vulnera-
bility and cannot be precisely detected by existing tools.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart contracts are programs running on top of blockchain
platforms such as Bitcoin [1] and Ethereum [2]. They have
been receiving much attention due to the capability to perform
effective financial transactions in a distributed system without
the intervention from trusted third parties (e.g., banks). A
smart contract is written in a high-level programming lan-
guage (e.g., Solidity [3]), and it is typically comprised of a
unique address, persistent storage holding a certain amount of
cryptocurrency (i.e., Ether in Ethereum), and a set of func-
tions that manipulate the persistent storage to fulfill credible
transactions without trusted parties. For contract-to-contract
interaction, some functions are public and callable by other
contracts. Thanks to the expressiveness afforded by the high-
level programming languages and the security guarantees from
the underlying consensus protocol, smart contracts have shown
many attractive use cases, and their number has skyrocketed,
with over 45 million [4] instances covering financial products,
online gaming, real estate [5], shipping, and logistics [6].
1 contract Victim {
2 private userBalances;
3
4 function withdraw() public {
5 uint amount = balances[msg.sender];
6 //call withdrawBalance again
7 msg.sender.call.value(amount)();
8 balances[msg.sender] = 0;
9 }
10 }
(a) The Vulnerable Program
1 contract Attacker {
2 ...
3 function () payable {
4 Victim v;
5 v.withdraw();
6 }
7 }
(b) The Attack Program
Fig. 1: Reentrancy Attack
Because all smart contracts deployed on a blockchain are
freely accessible through their public methods, any functional
bugs or vulnerabilities inside the contracts can lead to dis-
astrous losses, as demonstrated by recent attacks [7], [8], [9],
[10]. For instance, the code in Figure 1 illustrates a reentrancy
vulnerability exploited in the notorious DAO attack [7]. When
the victim program issues a money transaction (line 9 in
Figure 1a) to the attacker, it implicitly triggers the attacker’s
callback method (line 3 in Figure 1b), which invokes the
victim’s method again to make another transaction without up-
dating the victim’s balance. The DAO attack led to a financial
loss of $150M in 2016. To make things worse, smart contracts
are immutable—once they are deployed, fixing their bugs is
extremely difficult due to the design of the consensus protocol.
Improving robustness of smart contracts is thus a pressing
practical problem. It is also an active area of research, with
several contract analysis tools [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16]
developed in the past few years. However, these tools either
soundly overapproximate the execution of smart contracts and
report warnings [12], [14] that cannot be exploited in reality,
or they precisely enumerate [16], [13], [11] concrete traces of
smart contracts, so cannot scale to analyze large programs.
This paper presents SMARTSCOPY, a tool that uses program
synthesis to automatically generate adversarial smart contracts
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Fig. 2: Overview of SMARTSCOPY
(i.e., attack programs), which exploit common vulnerabili-
ties in victim contracts. To use our tool, a security analyst
expresses a target vulnerability query (e.g., the reentrancy
vulnerability from the DAO attack) as a declarative specifica-
tion. Then, SMARTSCOPY synthesizes an attack program that
exploits the victim’s public interface to satisfy the vulnerability
query. Given this problem, a naive approach is to enumerate
all possible candidate programs and then symbolically evaluate
each of them to check if it satisfies the query. While precise,
the naive approach fails to scale to realistic contracts. To tackle
this challenge, we employ a novel summary-based symbolic
evaluation, which enables SMARTSCOPY to both find real
attacks and scale to large programs.
Fig 2 shows an overview of our approach. Given the public
methods provided by the Application Binary Interface (ABI)
of a smart contract, our system first symbolically evaluates
each method and generates a summary that soundly records
the method’s side-effects on the storage as well as other global
state of the Blockchain. Even with the summaries, the search
space is still too large for brute-force enumeration. To address
this issue, we partition the search space by case splitting on the
range of symbolic variables, which allows us to simultaneously
explore multiple attack programs using an SMT-based sym-
bolic evaluation engine [17]. SMARTSCOPY further reduces
the search space by pruning infeasible candidates early, using
their abstract semantics. After that, our tool symbolically
evaluates each remaining candidate to check if any of them
satisfies the vulnerability query. If so, the candidate is returned
as a potential exploit.
We have evaluated SMARTSCOPY on the entire data set
(>25K) from etherscan [4] and shown that our tool is ex-
pressive, efficient, and effective. SMARTSCOPY’s query spec-
ification language is expressive in that it is rich enough
encode common vulnerabilities found in the literature (such
as the Reentrancy attack [7], Time manipulation [18], and
malicious access control [16]), Security Best Practices [19], as
well as the recent batchOverflow Bug [20] (CVE-201810299),
which allows the attacker to create an arbitrary amount of
cryptocurrency. SMARTSCOPY is efficient: on average it takes
only 8 seconds to analyze a smart contract from etherscan,
which is an order of magnitude faster than OYENTE [11] and
two orders of magnitude faster than CONTRACTFUZZER [13].
SMARTSCOPY is also effective in that it significantly outper-
forms two state-of-the-art smart contracts analyzers, namely,
OYENTE and CONTRACTFUZZER, in terms of false positive
and false negative rates. Furthermore, running on recent pop-
ular smart contracts, SMARTSCOPY uncovers 20 vulnerable
contracts that contain the BatchOverflow vulnerability and
cannot be precisely detected by existing tools.
In summary, this paper makes the following key
contributions:
• We formalize the problem of exploit generation as a pro-
gram synthesis problem and provide a way of expressing
common vulnerabilities in smart contracts as declarative
specifications (Section IV-B).
• We propose a summary-based symbolic evaluation tech-
nique that significantly reduces the number of instructions
that SMARTSCOPY has to execute (Section V).
• We develop an efficient attack synthesizer based on the
summary-based symbolic evaluation, which incorporates
a novel combination of search space partitioning, parallel
symbolic execution, and early pruning based on the
abstract semantics of candidate programs (Section VI-B).
• We perform a systematic evaluation of SMARTSCOPY
on the entire data set from etherscan. Our experiments
demonstrate the substantial benefits of our technique and
show that SMARTSCOPY outperforms two state-of-the-
art smart contracts analyzers in terms of running time,
precision, and soundness (Section VII).
II. BACKGROUND
This section briefly reviews the background on blockchains
and smart contracts.
A. Blockchain and Ethereum
Blockchain, invented by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008, is
a distributed public ledger that stores transactions between
different parties. A blockchain is comprised of a growing list
of blocks, each of which contains the hash of the previous
block, a timestamp when the block is appended, and transac-
tion value. Due to the decentralized consensus protocol, each
block is inherently resistant to modification once it is created.
While Satoshi’s original blockchain proposes a peer to
peer e-cash system that offers secure transactions, the
Ethereum [21] blockchain provides a more powerful dis-
tributed computing platform that can execute custom code
in the form of smart contracts. In addition to the crypto
tokens (i.e., Ether) that are transferred among parties during
a transaction, Ethereum also implements a gas scheme (ex-
plained in Section II-C) to incentivize miners who perform
the computationally expensive creation of new blocks.
... ...
From: 0x7d5c8c59837357e541bc7d87dee53fcbba55ba65
To: 0x8811fffcfc266844e8c36418389f7cda76c77ab7
Value: 0.05 Ether
Gas Limit: 31602
Input Data: 0x687474703a2f2f6c6f63616c686f73743a38353435
TABLE I: A sample transaction [24] obtained from Etherscan
B. Smart Contract
Smart contracts are programs that are stored and executed
on the blockchain. They are created through the transaction
system on the blockchain and are immutable once deployed.
Each smart contract is associated with a unique 256-bit
address; a private persistent storage; a certain amount of
cryptocurrency, denoted by balance (i.e., Ether in Ethereum)
held by the contract; and a piece of executable code that fulfills
complex computations to manipulate the storage and balance.
The code is typically written in a high-level Turing-complete
programming language such as Serpent [22], Vyper [23], and
Solidity [3], and then compiled to the Ethereum Virtual Ma-
chine (EVM) bytecode [21], a low-level stack-based language.
For instance, Figure 4a shows a smart contract written in the
Solidity programming language [3].
C. ABI and Transactions
In the Ethereum ecosystem, Smart Contracts communicate
with each other using the Contract Application Binary Inter-
face (ABI), which defines the signatures of public functions
provided by the hosted contract. While ABI offers a flexible
mechanism for communication, it also creates an attack surface
for exploits that use the ABI of a given smart contract. We
will elaborate on this in the following section. For instance,
Figure 4c shows the ABI for the smart contract in Figure 4a.
All interactions between smart contracts are fulfilled by
transactions. Table I shows a sample transaction obtained from
Etherscan. Here, the important fields are From, To, Value,
Gas Limit, and Input Data. In particular, From and
To represent the sender and recipient, respectively. Value
denotes the amount transferred from one smart contract to
another. Input Data contains the function’s signature (ob-
tained from the ABI) and its arguments. Finally, the Gas
Limit field specifies the amount of cryptocurrency which
a miner gets for conveying the transaction. The Ethereum
protocol [21] defines the gas cost for each bytecode instruction.
For instance, an integer division operation costs 5 units of gas
while a store operation on the storage can cost up to 20000.
As we will see in Section VII, the gas mechanism plays a key
role in several different types of vulnerabilities.
D. Threat Model
To synthesize an adversarial contract, we assume that we
can obtain the victim contract’s bytecode and the ABI speci-
fying its public methods. To confirm an adversarial contract is
indeed an exploit, we must also be able to invoke public meth-
ods by submitting transactions over the Ethereum Blockchain.
These requirements are easy to satisfy in practice.
Fig. 3: The key pattern of the BatchOverflow Vulnerability
III. OVERVIEW
In this section, we give an overview of our approach with
the aid of a motivating example.
A. Smart Contract Vulnerabilities
A security analyst can specify various types of vulnerabili-
ties that may appear in a smart contract. For instance, a Reen-
trancy vulnerability [7] occurs when an attacker’s previous
invocation is allowed to make new calls to the victim contract
before the previous execution is complete. This means that if
the call involves money transactions, the attacker can repeat-
edly trigger many transactions until the current procedure runs
out of gas. A Timestamp dependence vulnerability [18], on
the other hand, happens when a transaction relies on a certain
timestamp, which allows malicious miners to gain advantage
by choosing a suitable timestamp.
This section uses the most recent BatchOverflow Vulnerabil-
ity (CVE-201810299) [20] as a motivating example. Exploits
due to this vulnerability have resulted in the creation of
trillions of invalid Ethereum Tokens in 2018 [25], causing
major exchanges to temporary halt until all tokens could be re-
assessed. As shown in Fig 4a, the batchTransfer function
performs a multiplication that can overflow 256 bits, which
results in a small value that passes the check at line 12 and fur-
ther transfers a lage amount of tokens to the attacker (line 18).
SMARTSCOPY’s specifications are assertions expressed in
the Racket language [26]. In particular, the BatchOverflow
Vulnerability can be expressed as follows:
1 ∃ arg0, arg1, r1, r2, r3, call
2 (&& (= r3 (⊗ r1 r2))
3 (> [[r2]] [[r3]])
4 (interfere? r2 call.value)
5 (interfere? arg0 call.addr)
6 (interfere? arg1 call.value))
7 where ⊗ ∈{+,×}
We also visualize this vulnerability pattern in Fig 3. Here,
argi, rj , and call represent function arguments, registers,
and the CALL instruction (to perform a transaction in Solidity),
respectively. We use [[ri]] to denote the value (either concrete
or symbolic) in the register ri. The interfere? function,
which is defined in section IV, checks the interference between
two expressions. The interference [27] (denoted by an arrow
in Fig 3) in our system precisely captures the data- and
control-dependency. For instance, the vulnerability states that,
there exists a CALL instruction for which the beneficiary (i.e.,
recipient’s address) and value are controlled by the attacker
1 contract PausableToken {
2 bool flag = false;
3
4 function makeFlag(bool fg) {
5 flag = fg;
6 }
7
8 function batchTransfer(address[] _receivers,
uint256 _value) {
9 uint cnt = _receivers.length;
10 uint256 amount = uint256(cnt) * value;
11 require(flag);
12 require(balances[msg.sender] >= amount);
13
14 balances[msg.sender] =
15 balances[msg.sender].sub(amount);
16 for (uint i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
17 address recv = _receivers[i];
18 balances[recv] =
19 balances[recv].add(_value);
20 Transfer(msg.sender, recv, value);
21 }
22 return true;
23 }
24 }
(a) The Vulnerable Program
1 contract Attacker {
2 ...
3 function exploit() {
4 VulContract v;
5 v.makeFlag(true);
6 v.batchTransfer([0x123, 0x456], 2256 − 1);
7 }
8 }
(b) An Attack Program
1 {
2 "inputs": [
3 {"name": "_receivers", "type": "address[]"},
4 {"name": "_value", "type": "uint256"}
5 ],
6 "name": "batchTransfer", "type": "function"
7 ...
8 },{
9 "inputs": [{"name": "fg", "type": "bool"}],
10 "name": "makeFlag", "type": "function"}
(c) Contract Application Binary Interface (ABI) for the
vulnerable contract in Fig 4a
Fig. 4: A running example to show the BatchOverFlow Vul-
nerability
(line 5, 6). Furthermore, the transaction’s value is influenced
by a register (line 4) used in an arithmetic operation that
overflows (line 2,3).
Once a security analyst expresses the Batchoverflow vulner-
ability, the next step is to construct an attack to confirm that
the vulnerability indeed exists in the victim contract. Doing so
manually is challenging, however, because the analyst has to
understand the semantics of the smart contract and simulate
all possible interactions that an attacker may perform. As a
result, the analysis process is both tedious and error-pone.
B. SMARTSCOPY
SMARTSCOPY helps automate this process by searching for
attacks that exploit a given vulnerability in a victim contract.
As shown in Fig 2, the tool takes as input a potential vulner-
ability V expressed as declarative specifications. If V exists
in the victim contract, SMARTSCOPYautomatically synthesize
an attack program that exploits V . In practice, an attacker
typically interacts with a vulnerable contract through its public
methods defined in the ABI. Therefore, our goal is to construct
an attack program that exploits the victim’s ABI and that
contains at least one concrete trace where V holds.
To achieve this goal, SMARTSCOPY models the executions
of a smart contract as state transitions over registers, memory,
and storage. The vulnerability V is expressed in Racket as a
boolean predicate over these state transitions. The technical
challenge addressed by SMARTSCOPY is to efficiently search
for an attack program where V holds.
To illustrate the difficulty of this task, consider the problem
of synthesizing an attack program that exploits the BatchOver-
Flow vulnerability in Fig 4. The attack program performs a
complex three-step interaction with the victim contract. First,
the attacker must set the storage variable flag to true to
pass the check at line 11. Next, it needs to assign a large
number to value that leads to an overflow at line 10.
Finally, it specifies the attacker’s address as the beneficiary
of the transaction (line 18). Synthesizing this attack program
involves discovering which methods to call, in what order, and
with what arguments.
To find the desired attack program, it is not feasible to
brute-force generate all possible concrete programs and ex-
plore the space of their concrete traces. As we elaborate in
Section III-A, the search space is exponential to the size of
the attack program as well as its the number of branches.
To address this challenge, Section V proposes a
novel summary-based symbolic evaluation technique that
significantly reduces the number of instructions in the victim
contract that SMARTSCOPY has to execute symbolically
(Section V). Intuitively, our summary-based symbolic
evaluation enables SMARTSCOPY to only preserve state
transitions that are persistent across different transactions and
are sufficient to answer the vulnerability query.
Even with our summary-based symbolic evaluation, the
search space of attack candidates is still too large for brute-
force search. To further improve the performance, Section VI
introduces three optimizations. First, instead of exploring
the space of concrete programs, we leverage ROSETTE [17]
to explore the symbolic programs (Section VI-A). Second,
instead of eagerly explore the space of symbolic programs,
we design a simple but effective early pruning strategy that
allows SMARTSCOPY to prune infeasible symbolic candidates
before executing them (Section VI-C). Finally, instead of
executing each symbolic program sequentially, we partition
the search space by case splitting on the range of symbolic
variables, which enables SMARTSCOPY to simultaneously
explore multiple symbolic candidates (Section VI-B).
〈var〉 ::= def-sym (id τ )
(τ ∈ {boolean,number})
〈pc〉 ::= 〈const〉 | 〈var〉
〈expr〉 ::= 〈const〉 | 〈var〉 | 〈expr〉 ⊕ 〈expr〉
(⊕ ∈ {+,−,×, /,∨,∧, ...})
〈stmt〉 ::= 〈var〉 := 〈expr〉
| 〈var〉 := mload 〈var〉 | mstore 〈var〉 〈var〉
| 〈var〉 := sload 〈var〉 | sstore 〈var〉 〈var〉
| 〈var〉 := {balance, gas, address }
〈stmts〉 ::= 〈stmt〉 | 〈stmt〉; 〈stmts〉 | sha3 〈var〉 〈var〉
| jumpI 〈pc〉 〈expr〉 | jump 〈pc〉 | no-op
| call 〈var〉 〈var〉 〈var〉 | selfdestruct 〈var〉
〈param〉 ::= 〈var〉
〈params〉 ::= 〈param〉 | 〈param〉, 〈params〉
〈prog〉 ::= λ〈params〉. 〈stmts〉
Fig. 5: Intermediate Language for Smart Contract
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
This section formalizes the semantics of smart contracts,
shows how to express Smart Contract Vulnerabilities, and
defines what it means for a vulnerability to appear in a smart
contract.
A. Smart Contract Language
Figure 5 shows the core features of our intermediate lan-
guage for smart contracts. This language is a superset of
the EVM language. It includes standard EVM bytecode in-
structions such as assignment (x := e), memory operations
(mstore,mload), storage operations (sstore,sload),
hash operation (sha3), sequential composition (s1; s2), con-
ditional (jumpi) and unconditional jump (jump). It also
includes the EVM instructions specific to smart contracts:
call transfers the balance from the current contract to a re-
cipient whose address is specified as the argument, balance
accesses the current account balance, and selfdestruct
terminates a contract and transfers its balance to a given
address. Finally, our language extends EVM with features that
facilitate symbolic evaluation, including symbolic variables
(introduced by def-sym) and symbolic expressions (obtained
by operating on symbolic variables) whose concrete values
will be determined by an off-the-shelf SMT solver [28].
We define the semantics of the language operationally, as
shown in Figure 6. The meaning of each statement is given by
a state transition rule that specifies the statement’s effect on
the program state. We define states and transitions as follows.
Definition 1. (Program State) The Program State Γ consists
of a stack E, memory M , persistent storage S, global prop-
erties (e.g., balance, address, timestamp) of a smart contract,
s = no-op
no-op
Γ ` s : Γ′[pc++]
s = (jumpi d e)
Γ ` e : v
i = (v = 0)?(pc+ 1) : d
Γ′ = Γ[x← v, pc← i]
jmp
Γ ` s : Γ′
s = (param := def-sym(e, τ))
v = |(e, τ)|
Γ′ = Γ[param← v]
sym
Γ ` s : Γ′, v
s = (x := e) Γ ` e : v Γ′ = Γ[x← v]
assign
Γ ` s : Γ′[pc++], v
s = (x := e1 ⊕ e2)(⊕ ∈ {+,−, /,×})
Γ ` e1 : v1
Γ ` e2 : v2
v = v1 ⊕ v2
Γ′[x← v]
biop
Γ ` s : Γ′[pc++]
s = s1; s2
Γ ` s1 : Γ1, v1
Γ1 ` s2 : Γ2, v2seq
Γ ` s : Γ2, v2
s = (x := sload e)
Γ ` e : µ
Γ ` µ : v
Γ′[x← v]
sload
Γ ` s : Γ′[pc++], v
s = sstore µ e
Γ ` e : v Γ′[µ← v]
sstore
Γ ` s : Γ′[pc++]
s = (rl := call (e1 e2 e3))
Γ ` e1 : v1
Γ ` e2 : v2
Γ ` e3 : v3
v = calli(v1, v2, v3)
Γ′[rl ← v]
call
Γ ` s : Γ′[pc++], rl
s = (x := sha3 m e)
Γ ` m : v1
Γ ` e : v2
v = sha3i(v1, v2)
Γ′[x← v]
sha
Γ ` s : Γ′[pc++], v
Fig. 6: Operational semantics for our language in Figure 5
and the program counter pc. We use ei, mi, and µi to denote
variables from the stack, memory, and storage, respectively.
A program state also includes a model of the gas system in
EVM, but we omit this part of the semantics to simplify
the presentation. If a state maps a variable to a symbolic
expression, we call it an abstract state.
Definition 2. (State Transition over statement s) A State
Transition T over a statement s is denoted by a judgment of
the form Γ ` s : Γ′, v. The meaning of this judgment is the
following: assuming we successfully execute s under program
state Γ, it will result in value v and the new state is Γ′. We
use Γ ` s : ⊥ to indicate failure.
Most of the rules in Figure 6 specify the standard semantics
of EVM instructions. For example, the biop rule describes
the meaning of binary operations: it first looks up the values
(concrete or symbolic) of the operands in the current program
state Γ, applies the binary operator to those values (i.e., v1, v2),
and then binds the result to the target variable, increases the
program counter, and produces a new program state Γ′. The
sstore, sload, jmp, and seq rules are also standard.
The sym, sha3, and call rules, on the other hand, are
tailored for (efficient) symbolic evaluation. The sym rule in-
troduces symbolic values into the program state. The construct
|(e, τ)| denotes a fresh symbolic variable e of type τ , which
is bound to the def-sym parameter in the new program
state Γ′. Here, we do not increase the program counter as the
symbolic binding is not an EVM instruction. The sha3 and
call instructions are part of EVM, but we overapproximate
their semantics with uninterpreted functions to produce more
tractable vulnerability queries.
The standard semantics of the sha3 instruction is to obtain
a memory location by hashing a memory address and offset.
However, applying hashing functions to symbolic arguments
results in hard-to-solve queries. The sha3 rule therefore uses
an uninterpreted function, denoted by sha3i, to model the
original hash function.
As mentioned earlier, the call instruction is used to
initiate a transaction with another contract, whose address is
specified as an argument. The call rule uses an uninterpreted
function, denoted by calli, to model the effect of the call
instruction. Note that the rule also records the return value
of each call using a special variable rl in Γ, where l is
the location of the call command. This handling of call
instructions is key to our summary-based symbolic evaluation,
as explained in Section V.
Example 1. Figure 7a shows a smart contract written in So-
lidity. To analyze this contract, our system first translates it to
the program in Figure 7b, using the intermediate language in
Figure 5. The resulting program is then evaluated symbolically
using the operational semantics in Figure 6. For instance,
after executing the statement at line 2 in Figure 7b, register
r1 holds a symbolic value represented by amount - 1.
On the other hand, since SMARTSCOPY does not model the
event system in Solidity, we simply turn all its corresponding
instructions (e.g., line 14 in Figure 7a) into no-op.
B. Smart Contract Vulnerabilities
Having defined the meaning of smart contracts, we now
describe how to formally express smart contract vulnerabilities
and what it means for a vulnerability to appear in a program.
Definition 3. (Vulnerability) A Vulnerability V is a predicate
over a set of variables V in the program state. A vulnerability
V appears in the program P if the execution of P can reach
a program state Γ′ that satisfies V:
Γ′ |= V
The rest of this section introduces a few representative
vulnerabilities, and shows how they are encoded as formulas
in SMARTSCOPY. But first, we introduce an auxiliary function
interfere? which will be used by several vulnerabilities.
Definition 4. (Interference) A symbolic variable v interferes
with a symbolic expression e if they satisfy the following
constraint:
∃v0, v1. e[v0/v] 6= e[v1/v] ∧ (v0 6= v1)
Intuitively, changing v’s value will also affect e’s output, which
is denoted as “(interfere? v e)”. Interference precisely captures
the data- and control-dependencies between two expressions
and turns out to be the necessary condition of many exploits.
Section III describes the BatchOverflow vulnerability, which
enables an attacker to perform a multiplication that overflows
and transfers a large amount of tokens on the attacker’s behalf.
This vulnerability can be formalized as follows:
Vulnerability 1. BatchOverflow
∃arg0, arg1, r1, r2, r3, call
r3 = (r1 ⊗ r2) ∧ [[r2]] > [[r3]] ∧ (interfere? r2 call.value) ∧
(interfere? arg0 call.addr) ∧ (interfere? arg1 call.value)
(1)
In other words, the victim program contains a call instruc-
tion whose beneficiary and value can be controlled by the
attacker. Furthermore, the transaction value is also influenced
by a variable from an arithmetic operation that overflows.
A Timestamp Dependency vulnerability occurs if a transac-
tion depends on a timestamp:
Vulnerability 2. Timestamp Dependency
∃ timestamp, call. call.value > 0 ∧
(interfere? timestamp call.value)
(2)
This vulnerability enables a malicious miner to gain an ad-
vantage by choosing a suitable timestamp for a block.
For some critical instructions such as delegatecall and
call, runtime errors will not lead to a rollback of the current
state and the programmer is responsible for manually checking
the return values and restoring the program state. Failing
to do so can lead to an Unchecked-send Vulnerability with
unexpected behavior [29]. We formalize the absence of this
check as follows:
Vulnerability 3. Unchecked-send (Gasless-send)
¬∀ call.ret,∃ jmp.var(interfere? call.ret jmp.var) (3)
1 pragma solidity ˆ0.4.23;
2 contract EubChainIco is PausableToken {
3 ...
4 function vestedTransfer(address _to, uint256
_amount) {
5 ...
6 require(_amount > 0);
7 vesting.amount = _amount.sub(1);
8 transfer(msg.sender, _to, vesting.amount)
;
9
10 uint256 v1 = _amount - 15;
11 uint256 wei = v1;
12 uint t1 = vesting.startTime;
13
14 emit VestTransfer(msg.sender, _to, wei,
t1, _);
15 ...
16 }
17 }
(a) A Smart Contract written in Solidity.
(b) Symbolic Interpretation
1 assert(_amount > 0);
2 r1 := _amount - 1;
3 sstore(vesting.amount, _amount - 1);
4 call(msg.sender, _to, _amount - 1);
5
6 r2 := amount - 15;
7 r3 := amount - 15;
8 r4 := sload(vesting.startTime);
9 no-op;
(c) Summary Extraction
1 sstore(vesting.amount, _amount - 1)
[ amount>0];
2 call(msg.sender, _to, _amount - 1)
[ amount>0];
(d) Abstract Interpretation
1 if (_amount > 0)
2 sstore(vesting.amount, _amount - 1);
3 if (_amount > 0)
4 call(msg.sender, _to, _amount - 1);
Fig. 7: From Symbolic Interpretation to Summary-based Abstract Interpretation
Here, the return value of a call instruction does not inter-
fere with the conditional variables of any conditional jump
statements. In other words, this return value is not checked.
In section I, we briefly introduce the Reentrancy vulner-
ability. This vulnerability occurs when an attacker’s call is
allowed to repeatedly make new calls to the same victim
contract without updating the victim’s balance. It can be
overapproximated as follows:
Vulnerability 4. Reentrancy
∃ arg, i, j, k, l. i+ 1 = j ∧ j < k
l[i] = “call” ∧ l[j] = “call” ∧ l[k] = “store” ∧
l[i].gas > 2300 ∧ (interfere? arg l[i].addr)
where l is an execution trace.
(4)
In other words, if an attack program has the minimum gas (i.e.,
2300) to control the recipient of a transaction and generate
consecutive call instructions before updating the storage,
there may exist a Reentrancy vulnerability.
C. Attack Synthesis.
Given a vulnerability query, we are interested in synthesiz-
ing an attack program that can exploit this vulnerability in a
victim contract. The basic building blocks of an attack program
are called components, and each component C corresponds to
a public function provided by a victim contract. We use Υ to
denote the union of all publicly available methods.
Definition 5. (Component) A Component C from an ABI
configuration is a pair (f, τ) where:
• f is C’s name.
• τ is the type signature of C.
Example 2. Considering the ABI configuration in Figure 4c,
its first element (line 2-12) declares a component for the prob-
lematic batchTransfer method in figure 4a. In particular,
this component takes inputs as an array of address and a
256-bit integer (uint256).
We represent a set of candidate attack programs as a
symbolic program, which is a sequence of holes to be filled
with components from Υ. The synthesizer fills these holes to
obtain a concrete program that exploits a given vulnerability.
Definition 6. (Symbolic Attack Program) Given a set of
components Υ = {(f1, τ1), . . . , (fN , τN )}, a symbolic attack
program S for Υ is a sequence of statement holes of the form
choose(f1(~vτ1), . . . , fN (~vτN ));
where fi(~vτi) stands for the application of the i-th component
to fresh symbolic values of types specified by τi.
Definition 7. (Concrete Attack Program) A concrete attack
program for a symbolic program S replaces each hole in S
with one of the specified function calls, and each symbolic
argument to a function call is replaced with a concrete value.
Example 3. Here is a symbolic program that captures the
attack candidate in Fig 4b:
choose(makeFlag(x1), batchTransfer(y1,z1));
choose(makeFlag(x2), batchTransfer(y2,z2));
And here is a concrete attack program for this symbolic attack:
makeFlag(true);
batchTransfer([0x123,0x345], 2256 − 1);
Note that we use the choose construct to represent holes
in symbolic programs only for notational convenience. Since
our smart contract language supports symbolic values, every
instance of choose can be expressed using a conditional
statement that guards the specified choices with fresh sym-
bolic booleans. For example, choose(e1, e2) is a notational
shorthand for the statement if b1 then e1 else e2, where b1
is a fresh symbolic boolean value. A concrete attack program
therefore substitutes concrete values for the implicit choose
guards and the explicit function arguments of a symbolic attack
program. So, all attack programs are expressible in our smart
contract language with no extra machinery.
Since attack programs are valid programs in our language,
their semantics is given by the rules in Figure 6. We write
[[S0; ...Sn; ]]Γ to represent the result of executing the attack
program S = S0; ...Sn; from the program state Γ. If S is
a symbolic attack program, then [[S0; ...Sn; ]]Γ represents the
states Γ∗ reachable by all concrete programs for S starting
from the state Γ. The goal of attack synthesis is to find a
concrete program P for a given symbolic program S such
that P reaches a state satisfying a desired vulnerability query.
Definition 8. (Problem Specification) The specification for
our attack synthesis problem is a tuple (Γ0, V , S) where:
• S is a symbolic attack program for the set of components
Υ of a victim contract V .
• Γ0 is the initial state of the symbolic attack program,
obtained by executing the victim’s initialization code.
• V is a first-order formula over program states Γ∗ reach-
able from Γ0 by the attack program S.
Definition 9. (Attack Synthesis) Given a specification (Γ0,
V , S), the Attack Synthesis problem is to find a concrete attack
program P for S such that:
• [[P ]]Γ0 = Γ
• Γ |= V
In other words, executing the concrete attack P from the initial
state Γ0 results in a program state Γ that satisfies V .
V. SUMMARY-BASED SYMBOLIC EVALUATION
Solving the attack synthesis problem involves searching for
a concrete program P in the space of candidate attacks defined
by a symbolic program S. SMARTSCOPY delegates this search
to an off-the-shelf SMT solver, by using symbolic evaluation
to reduce the attack synthesis problem to a satisfiability query.
Given a specification (Γ0,V,S), SMARTSCOPY evaluates S
on the state Γ0 to obtain the state [[S]]Γ0 , and then uses the
solver to check the satisfiability of the formula ∃~v.V([[S]]Γ0),
where ~v denotes the symbolic variables in S. A model of this
formula, if it exists, binds every variable in ~v to a concrete
value, and so represents a concrete attack program P for S
that triggers the vulnerability V .
But computing [[S]]Γ0 is expensive, as it relies on symbolic
execution [17]. In particular, evaluating S involves evaluating
each of its choose statements, which, in turn, requires sym-
bolically executing each function call in that statement. So,
for a symbolic program of length K, every public function in
the victim contract must be symbolically executed K times on
different symbolic arguments. As we will see in section VII,
this direct approach to evaluating S does not scale to real
contracts that contain a large number of complex public
functions. To mitigate this issue, we use a summary-based
symbolic evaluation that performs symbolic execution of each
public method only once.
Our approach is based on the following insight. An attack
program performs a sequence of transactions—i.e., method
invocations—that manipulate the victim’s persistent storage
and global properties. The transactions that comprise an
attack exchange data and influence each other’s control flow
exclusively through these two parts of the program state. So,
if we can faithfully summarize the effects of a public method
on the persistent storage and global properties, evaluating this
summary on the symbolic arguments passed to the method is
equivalent to symbolically executing the method itself.
Definition 10. A summary M in our system is a pair s@φ
where s represents a statement that has a side effect on the
persistent state (i.e., storage and global properties) of a smart
contract, and φ denotes the path condition of executing s.
We generate such faithful method summaries in two steps.
First, we use the rules in Figure 5 to execute the method
on a program state ΓA that maps every state variable (i.e.,
persistent storage location, global property, etc.) to a fresh
symbolic variable of the right type. This symbolic execution
step produces a path condition and symbolic inputs for each
instruction that capture every possible way to reach and
execute the instruction within the given method. Next, we use
the procedure in Figure 8a to generate the method summary.1
Given a storage-store instruction sstore(x,y) and its path
condition, we generate a “summary sstore” statement (i.e.,
sstore) that takes as input the name of the storage variable
(i.e., x) and the symbolic expression [[y]] held in the register
y. Similarly, given a call(gas,addr,value) instruction
and path condition, we emit its “summary call” statement (i.e.,
call) that takes as input the symbolic expressions of the in-
struction’s gas consumption, recipient address, and amount of
cryptocurrency, respectively. All other instructions are omitted
from the summary since they have no effect on the persistent
state. By construction, our summary therefore precisely
captures all of the method’s effects on the persistent state.
Example 4. Figure 7c shows the summary of the program in
Figure 7b. Using the rule in Figure 8a, our tool summarizes
the side effects of the call and sstore instructions at
lines 3 and 4, respectively. The remaining instructions (lines
6–9) are omitted from the summary.
Given a method summary and a program state Γ, we use the
procedure in Figure 8b to reproduce the effects of executing
the method symbolically on Γ as follows. Recall that we
1We omitted the details of other instructions such as selfdestruct and
delegatecall.
1 (define (get-summary s φ)
2 (match s
3 [call(x, y, z) call([[x]], [[y]], [[z]])@φ]
4 [sstore(x, y) sstore(x, [[y]])@φ]
5 [_ [[ ]])]))
(a) Procedure for Summary Generation
1 (define (interpret-summary s@φ Γ)
2 (define sΓ@φΓ (substitute s@φ Γ))
3 (match sΓ
4 [call(xΓ, yΓ, zΓ) (when φΓ call(xΓ, yΓ, zΓ))]
5 [sstore(xΓ, yΓ) (when φΓ sstore(xΓ, yΓ))]
6 [_ no-op]))
(b) Procedure for Summary Interpretation
Fig. 8: Summary Generation & Interpretation
generate the summary by executing the method on a fully
symbolic state ΓA = {x1 7→ v1, . . . , xn 7→ vn}, so every path
condition and symbolic expression in the summary is given
in terms of the symbolic variables v1, . . . , vn. Our summary
interpretation procedure works by substituting each vi in an
instruction’s path condition and inputs with its corresponding
value in Γ, i.e., Γ[xi]. The resulting instruction summary
sΓ@φΓ is therefore expressed in terms of Γ, so applying its
side effects sΓ under the path condition φΓ is equivalent to
executing the instruction s in the original method on the state
Γ. Since we interpret every instruction in the summary in this
way, the combined effect on the persistent state is equivalent
to executing the original method symbolically on Γ.
Example 5. Figure 7d shows an example for interpreting
the summary in Figure 7c by applying the procedure in
Figure 8b. Specifically, given the call summary at line 2
in Figure 7c, we first generate an if statement guarded by
the path condition φ for the current summary, then in the body
of the if statement we symbolically simulate the side effect of
the call statement by applying the call rule in Figure 6.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
This section discusses the design and implementation of
SMARTSCOPY, as well as two key optimizations that enable
our tool to efficiently solve the synthesis attack problem.
A. Symbolic Computation Using ROSETTE
SMARTSCOPY leverages ROSETTE [17] to symbolically
search for attack programs. ROSETTE is a programming lan-
guage that provides facilities for symbolic evaluation. These
facilities are based on three constructs: assertions, symbolic
values, and (satisfiability) queries. ROSETTE programs use
assertions and symbolic values to formulate queries about pro-
gram behavior, which are then solved with off-the-shelf SMT
solvers. For example, the (solve expr) query searches for
a binding of symbolic variables to concrete values that satisfies
the assertions encountered during the symbolic evaluation of
1 (define (smartscopy V Υ K)
2 (define (stmt) (apply choose* Υ))
3 ;;Generate a symbolic attack program of size
K.
4 (define program (map (λ (x) (stmt)) (range K)
))
5 (define (progstate)
6 ;;Program state has registers, memory,
storage,
7 ;;gas, and other global information.
8 (progstate (for/vector ([i config]) ’reg)
9 (init-memory)
10 (init-storage)
11 ’gas ;;gas consumption
12 ...))
13 (define i-pstate (send machine get-state ...))
14 (define o-pstate (interpret program i-state))
15 (define binding (solve (assert (V o-pstate)))
)
16 (evaluate program binding))
Fig. 9: SMARTSCOPY implementation in ROSETTE.
the program expression expr. SMARTSCOPY uses the solve
query to search for a concrete attack program.
Figure 9 shows the implementation of SMARTSCOPY in
Rosette. The tool takes as input a vulnerability specification
V , the components Υ of a victim program, and a bound K on
the length of the attack program. Given these inputs, lines 2–4
use Υ to construct a symbolic attack program of length K.
Next, lines 5–13 run the victim’s initialization code to obtain
the initial program state, i-pstate, for the attack. Then, line
14 evaluates the symbolic attack program on the initial state
to obtain a symbolic output state, o-pstate. Finally, lines
15-16 use the solve query to search for a concrete attack
program that satisfies the vulnerability assertion.
The core of our tool is the interpreter for our smart
contract language (Figure 5), which implements the opera-
tional semantics given in Figure 6. We use this interpreter to
compute the symbolic summaries of the victim’s public meth-
ods (Section V) and to evaluate symbolic attack programs.
The interpreter itself does not implement symbolic execution;
instead, it uses ROSETTE’s symbolic evaluation engine to
execute programs in our language on symbolic values.
Another key component of SMARTSCOPY is the translator
that converts EVM bytecode into our language (Figure 5). The
translator leverages the Vandal Decompiler [14] to soundly
convert the stack-based EVM bytecode into its corresponding
three-address format in our language. The jump targets are
resolved through abstract interpretation [30]. We use the
translator to convert victim contracts to the SMARTSCOPY
language for attack synthesis. Both the translator and the
interpreter support all the instructions defined in the Ethereum
specification [21].
B. Parallel Synthesis using Hoisting
SMARTSCOPY uses summary-based symbolic evaluation to
efficiently reduce attack synthesis problems to satisfiability
queries. But the resulting queries can still be too difficult (for
both ROSETTE and the underlying solver) to solve in practice,
especially when the victim contract has many public methods.
So to further improve performance, SMARTSCOPY exploits
the structure of symbolic attack programs (Definition 6) to
decompose the single solve query in Figure 9 into multiple
smaller queries that can be solved quickly and in parallel,
without missing any concrete attacks.
The basic idea is as follows. Given a set of N components
and a bound K on the length of the attack, lines 2–4 create a
symbolic attack program of the following form:
choose1(f1( ~v1τ1 ), . . . , fN ( ~v1τN ));
...
chooseK(f1( ~vkτ1 ), . . . , fN ( ~vKτN ));
This symbolic attack encodes a set of concrete attacks that
can also be expressed using NK symbolic programs that
fix the choice of the method to call at each line, but leave
the arguments symbolic. So, we can enumerate these NK
programs and solve the vulnerability query for each of them,
instead of solving the single query at line 15. This approach
essentially hoists the symbolic boolean guards out of the
choose statements in the original query, and SMARTSCOPY
explores all possible values for these guards explicitly, rather
than via SMT solving. As we show in Section VII, hoisting
the guards leads to significantly faster synthesis, both because
it enables parallel solving of the smaller queries, and because
the smaller queries can be solved quickly.
C. SMT-based Early Pruning
In addition to hoisting, we also design a simple but effective
early pruning strategy that allows SMARTSCOPY to prune
infeasible symbolic programs before executing them. The
intuition behind our early pruning strategy is that all attacks
expressible in SMARTSCOPY (e.g., [7], [8], [9]) invoke at least
one public method that manipulates persistent storage and at
least one public method that transfers cryptocurrency using the
call instruction. In other words, a successful attack executes
at least one store instruction followed by at least one call
instruction. We express our early pruning strategy using the
following ROSETTE program:
1 (define (may-store-and-call? p)
2 (solve (exists (list i j)
3 (and (< i j) (= (type p[i]) ’store)
4 (= (type p[j]) ’call)))))
This procedure queries the solver to find out if the given sym-
bolic program p contains any concrete attack program that ex-
ecutes a call after a store. This query is much faster to solve
than a vulnerability query, so if p contains no feasible candi-
date, SMARTSCOPY does not run the vulnerability query for it.
VII. EVALUATION
We evaluated SMARTSCOPY by conducting two experi-
ments that are designed to answer the following questions:
• Q1: Expressiveness: Can SMARTSCOPY express the spec-
ifications of real world vulnerabilities?
• Q2: Effectiveness: How does SMARTSCOPY compare
against state-of-the-art analyzers for smart contracts?
• Q3: Efficiency: How much does summary-based symbolic
evaluation improve the performance of SMARTSCOPY?
To answer these questions, we perform a systematic eval-
uation by running SMARTSCOPY on the entire set of smart
contracts from Etherscan [4]. Using a snapshot from August
30 2018, we obtained a total number of 25,983 smart contracts.
Similar to the teEther [16] paper, we restrict the maximum
size of our attack programs to three. All experiments in
this section are conducted on a t3.2xlarge machine on
Amazon EC2 with an Intel Xeon Platinum 8000 CPU and
32G of memory, running the Ubuntu 18.04 operating system
and using a timeout of 10 minutes for each smart contract.
A. Expressiveness of SMARTSCOPY
To understand the expressiveness of our tool, we encoded
the common vulnerabilities in smart contracts described in
prior work [18], [31] and on social media [25]. In particular,
Table II summarizes the expressiveness of existing tools for
Smart Contract security, ordered by publish date. Note that
our tool supports not only well-known vulnerabilities such
as Reentrancy, Timestamp Dependency, and Arithmetic op-
erations (i.e., over/underflow), but also recent attacks such as
the short address attack and the BatchOverflow vulnerability
discussed in Section III. Prior tools express a portion of these
vulnerabilities. For instance, the popular OYENTE [11] tool,
which is also based on symbolic execution, does not support
vulnerabilities such as unchecked calls, short address, and out-
of-gas-DoS. Static analysis tools such as Securify [12] and
MADMAX [14] do not support complex arithmetic vulnerabil-
ities. Most importantly, unlike SMARTSCOPY, none of them
can generate exploits for vulnerabilities. The teEther and the
CONTRACTFUZZER tools can automatically generate exploits,
but their systems only support a small class of vulnerabilities.
There are some vulnerabilities that our tool does not support
well. For instance, a Transaction-Ordering Dependency (TOD)
is a race condition vulnerability, and exploiting it requires
synthesizing a pair of programs that exhibit the race. In the
future, we plan to explore relational synthesis to handle attacks
that require multiple programs. Another source of limitation
is denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that involve loops, which
our tool unrolls during symbolic execution, and the unrolling
bound may not be big enough to trigger the vulnerability.
B. Comparison with Existing Tools
To demonstrate the advantages of our proposed approach,
we compare SMARTSCOPY against two state-of-the-art ana-
lyzers that are publicly available: OYENTE, based on symbolic
execution, and CONTRACTFUZZER, based on dynamic random
testing 2.
a) Comparison with OYENTE: We first compare with
OYENTE [11], which takes as input a smart contract and
2Other tools like teEther and Securify are not available for comparison at
the time of this submission.
Tool GenerateExploit?
Common Vulnerabilities
Reentrance Arithmetic DoS BadRandom Timestamp TOD
Unchecked
Calls
Access
Control
Short
Address
OYENTE [11] G# 3 3 3 G#
Mythril [32] G# 3 3 3 G# 3 3
Zeus [15] 3 3 3 G# 3 3
teEther [16] 3
Securify [12] 3 3 G# 3 3
MADMAX [14] G# G#
ContractFuzzer [13] 3 3 3 3 G#
SMARTSCOPY 3 3 3 G# 3 3 G# 3 3 3
TABLE II: A Comparison of Existing Tools for Smart Contract (Order by publish date). G# represents limited support.
.
Vulnerability Number of vulnerable contracts
S ∧O S −O O − S
Timestamp 485 842 39
Reentracy 49 128 41
TABLE III: Comparing SMARTSCOPY (S) against OYENTE
(O). S ∧ O, S − O, and O − S represent # of benchmarks
reported by both tools, S only, and O only, respectively.
checks whether there are concrete traces that match the
tool’s predefined security properties. If so, the tool returns
a counterexample as the exploit. We evaluate OYENTE and
SMARTSCOPY on the Etherscan data set, and both systems
use a timeout of ten minutes.
The OYENTE tool supports four different types of
vulnerabilities, namely, call-stack-limit, Timestamp depen-
dency [10], Reentrancy [7], and Transaction-Ordering de-
pendency (TOD) [10]. Since the call-stack-limit vulnerability
had already been fixed by the Solidity team and the TOD
vulnerability requires synthesizing multiple programs, we will
cover the remaining two vulnerabilities.
b) Summary of results: The results of our evaluation
are summarized in Table III. In particular, for the Times-
tamp dependency vulnerability, there are 485 benchmarks
where both tools report a vulnerability and find the exploits.
39 benchmarks are flagged as vulnerable by OYENTE but
SMARTSCOPY can not find the exploits. We manually in-
spected the source code of those benchmarks and confirm that
30 of them are false positives. On the other hand, 842 bench-
marks are flagged as safe by OYENTE while SMARTSCOPY
manages to find their exploits. To verify the reports of our tool,
we randomly select 20 benmarks and confirm 18 of them are
actually vulnerable. In the meantime, we also contacted the
author of OYENTE and confirmed our report.
For the Reentrancy vulnerability, 49 benchmarks are flagged
by both tools. 41 benchmarks are flagged as vulnerable
by OYENTE while SMARTSCOPY cannot find the exploits.
After manual inspection, we confirm all of them are false
positives. In contrast, 128 benchmarks are marked as safe
but SMARTSCOPY successfully finds their exploits, and we
manage to reproduce 102 of the attacks in our testbed.
To further understand the effectiveness of both tools, we
randomly pick 20 samples from a subset of the data where
each contract is flagged as vulnerable by at least one tool.
We repeat this process three times and report the average. As
Vulnerability SMARTSCOPY OYENTEFP FN FP FN
Timestamp 7% 10% 36% 35%
Reentrancy 14% 5% 43% 37%
TABLE IV: Analysis of the results based on full inspection
on 20 random samples from S ∪O
shown in Table IV, for the Timestamp vulnerability, the FN
and FP rates of SMARTSCOPY are 7% and 10%, while the FN
and FP rates of OYENTE on our selected data set are 36% and
35%. The result on the Reentrancy vulnerability is similar: the
FN and FP rates of SMARTSCOPY are 14% and 5%, while the
FN and FP rates of OYENTE are 43% and 37%.
c) Performance: OYENTE takes an average of 91 seconds
to analyze a contract, while SMARTSCOPY only takes an
average of 8 seconds for this data set.
d) Discussion: To understand why OYENTE has higher
false positive and negative rates than SMARTSCOPY, we
manually inspected 20 randomly chosen samples from each
category. The results of this analysis are as follows.
The high false negative rate in OYENTE is caused by low
coverage on the corresponding benchmarks. Specifically, in the
presence of large and complex benchmarks, OYENTE fails to
generate traces that trigger the vulnerability. Moreover, since
the Keccak-256 hash function is ubiquitous in smart contracts,
and hard for the solver to reason about, OYENTE fails to cover
the code regions that have dependencies on the hash function.
The false positives in OYENTE can be attributed to two root
causes. The first is that the tool does not model the semantics
of the gas system, and its query language cannot reason about
gas consumption in a smart contract. For instance, OYENTE
will report spurious Reentrancy vulnerabilities even though the
gas specified by the victim is insufficient for an attacker to
generate the exploit. On the other hand, since SMARTSCOPY
precisely models the semantics of the gas system, we are able
to achieve a low false positive rate. The second cause of false
positives is due to the exploration of paths that an attacker
cannot trigger. For instance, OYENTE marks the following
code as Reentrancy vulnerability even though an attacker has
no permission to trigger it.
1 public function mintETHRewards(
2 address _contract, uint256 _amount)
3 onlyManager() {
4 require(_contract.call.value(_amount)());}
Vulnerability SMARTSCOPY CONTRACTFUZZERNo. FP FN No. FP FN
Timestamp 16 0 1 13 4 7
Gasless Send 17 0 0 14 3 6
Bad Random 9 0 0 5 1 5
TABLE V: Comparing SMARTSCOPY against CONTRACT-
FUZZER
We also investigated the cause of false positives reported by
SMARTSCOPY. It turns out that the false positives are caused
by the imprecision of our queries. Recall from Section IV-B
that we use a specific pattern of traces to overapproximate
the behavior of the Reentrancy attack. While effective and
efficient in practice, our query may generate spurious exploits
that are infeasible. To mitigate this limitation, one compelling
approach for developing secure smart contracts is to ask the
developers to provide invariants for preventing the vulnerabil-
ities, and then use SMARTSCOPY to search for exploits that
violate the invariants.
C. Comparison with CONTRACTFUZZER
We further compared SMARTSCOPY against CONTRACT-
FUZZER [13], a recent smart contract analyzer based on dy-
namic fuzzing. Specifically, CONTRACTFUZZER takes input as
the ABI interfaces of smart contracts and randomly generates
inputs invoking the public methods provided by the ABI. To
verify the correctness of the exploits, CONTRACTFUZZER im-
plements oracles for different vulnerabilities by instrumenting
the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) with extra assertions.
We use the docker image [33] provided by the author
of CONTRACTFUZZER. The original paper does not discuss
the performance of the tool, but from our experience, CON-
TRACTFUZZER is slow, taking more than 10 mins to fuzz
a smart contract. Since it would be time-consuming to run
CONTRACTFUZZER on the Etherscan data set, we evaluate
both tools on the 33 benchmarks from the CONTRACTFUZZER
artifact [34] plus another 67 random samples from Etherscan
for which we know the ground truth.
a) Summary of results: The results of our evaluation are
summarized in Table V. In particular, for the timestamp de-
pendency, CONTRACTFUZZER flags 13 benchmarks as vulner-
able. However, 4 of them are false alarms, and it fails to detect
7 vulnerable benchmarks. On the other hand, SMARTSCOPY
detects most of the benchmarks with only one false negative,
which is caused by a timeout on the Vandal decompiler [14].
Similarly, for the Gasless-send vulnerability, 14 benchmarks
are flagged by CONTRACTFUZZER. However, 3 of them are
false positives, and 6 vulnerable benchmarks can not be
detected within 10 minutes. In contrast, SMARTSCOPY suc-
cessfully generates exploits for all the vulnerable benchmarks.
b) Performance: On average, it takes CONTRACT-
FUZZER 10 mins to analyze a smart contract. SMARTSCOPY
takes an average of 11 seconds on this data set.
c) Discussion: The cause of false negatives in CON-
TRACTFUZZER is easy to understand as it is based on random,
rather than exhaustive, exploration of an extremely large
S†-mean S-mean # of Benchmarks Timeout
S† ∧ S S† − S S − S†
8s 35s 1846 548 17454
TABLE VI: Comparison between Summary-based (S†) and
Non-summary (S). S† ∧S, S†−S, and S−S† represent
number of benchmarks timeout on both, S† only, and S only,
respectively.
search space. So if there are relatively few inputs in this space
that lead to an attack, CONTRACTFUZZER is unlikely to find it
within the given time bound (10 minutes). On the other hand,
the false positives in CONTRACTFUZZER are caused by the
limited expressiveness of its assertion language. For instance,
the Time Dependency is defined as the following assertion in
CONTRACTFUZZER:
TimestampOp ∧ (SendCall ∨ EtherTransfer)
The assertion raises a Time Dependency vulnerability if the
smart contract contains the timestamp and call instruc-
tions. It is easy to raise false alarms with this assertion if the
call instruction does not depend on timestamp. On the
other hand, the interfere? function enables SMARTSCOPY
to reason about this dependency precisely.
D. Impact of Summary-based Symbolic Evaluation
To understand the impact of our summary-based symbolic
evaluation described in Section V, we run SMARTSCOPY on
the Etherscan data set with (S†) and without (S) computing
the summary. To speed up the evaluation, for both settings, we
enable the early pruning and parallel synthesis optimizations
discussed in Section VI.
As shown in Table VI, if we exclude the benchmarks
that timeout in 10 mins, the mean time of our summary-
based symbolic evaluation is only 8 seconds, while it takes
35 seconds without computing the summary. Furthermore,
1846 benchmarks time out for both settings, and only 548
benchmarks time out on S† but not on S. However, without
computing the summary, 17454 (i.e., 69.8%) benchmarks time
out. The result confirms that the summary-based technique is
key to the efficiency of SMARTSCOPY.
E. A case study on the recent BatchOverflow vulnerability
To evaluate whether SMARTSCOPY can discover new vul-
nerabilities in real world smart contracts, we conduct a case
study on the recent BatchOverflow Vulnerability. As we men-
tioned in Section III, exploits due to this vulnerability have
resulted in the creation of trillions of invalid Ethereum Tokens
in 2018 [25], causing major exchanges to temporary halt until
all tokens could be reassessed. We note that generating exploits
for this vulnerability is quite challenging as it requires the tool
to reason about the combination of arithmetic operations, in-
terference, and the read-write semantics of the storage system
in Solidity. For instance, existing tools such as OYENTE and
MADMAX [14] will simply mark a large number of arithmetic
operations as potentially vulnerable, and it turns out that most
of the alarms are not exploitable.
Similar to our previous experiment, we first encode the
vulnerability (Section IV-B) in our language and then run
our tool on the Etherscan data set. SMARTSCOPY gener-
ates exploits for 32 vulnerable contracts. To verify that the
exploits are effective, we setup a private blockchain using
the Geth [35] framework where we can run exploits on the
vulnerable contracts. We confirmed that 20 exploits are valid.
The infeasible attacks come from the incompleteness of the
query as well as imprecise control flow graphs from the Vandal
decompiler. Since those contracts are covered by neither the
previous literature nor the media, we also sent the issues to
their developers.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Smart contract security has been extensively studied in
recent years. In this section we briefly discuss prior closely
related work.
a) Smart Contract Analysis: Many popular security an-
alyzers for smart contracts are based on symbolic execu-
tion [36]. Well-known tools include Oyente [11], Mythril [32]
and Manticore [37]. Their key idea is to find an execu-
tion path that satisfies a given property or assertion. While
SMARTSCOPY also uses symbolic evaluation to search for at-
tack programs, our system differs from these tools in two ways.
First, the prior tools adopt symbolic execution for bug finding.
Our tool can be used not only for bug finding but also for
exploit generation. Second, while symbolic execution is a pow-
erful and precise technique for finding security vulnerabilities,
it does not guarantee to explore all possible paths, which leads
to high false negative rates as shown in Section VII-B0a. In
contrast, SMARTSCOPY proposes a summary-based symbolic
evaluation which significantly reduces the number of paths it
has to explore while maintaining the same precision.
To address the scalability and path explosion problems in
symbolic execution, researchers developed sound and scalable
static analyzers [38], [12], [14], [15]. Both Securify [12] and
Madmax [14] are based on abstract interpretation [30], which
soundly overapproximates and merges relevant execution paths
to avoid path explosion. The ZEUS [15] system takes the
source code of a smart contract and a policy as inputs, and
then compiles them into LLVM IRs that will be checked
by an off-the-shelf verifier [39]. The ECF [38] system is
designed to detect the DAO vulnerability. Similar to our tool,
Securify also provides a query language to specify the patterns
of common vulnerabilities. Unlike our tool, none of these
systems can generate exploits. We could not directly compare
SMARTSCOPY with Securify and Zeus as their tools and
benchmarks are not publicly available. However, we note that
our system is complementary to existing static analyzers such
as Securify: in particular, we can use Securify to filter out
safe smart contracts and leverage SMARTSCOPY to generate
exploits for vulnerable ones.
Some systems [40], [41] for reasoning about smart contracts
rely on formal verification. These systems prove security
properties of smart contracts using existing interactive theorem
provers [42], [43]. They typically offer strong guarantees that
are crucial to smart contracts. However, unlike our system, all
of them require significant manual effort to encode the security
properties and the semantics of smart contracts.
Finally, projects [44], [14], [45] related to reverse engi-
neering aim to to lift EVM bytecode to an intermediate
representation that is easy to analyze. Although SMARTSCOPY
uses the IRs from Vandal [14], our technique is agnostic to
the underlying language.
b) Automatic Exploitation: Our work is also closely
related to automatic exploitation [46], [47], [16], [13]. While
those prior systems rely on constraint solvers to generate
counterexamples as potential exploits, we note that there
are additional challenges in automatic exploitation for smart
contracts. First, the exploits in classical vulnerabilities (e.g.,
buffer overflows, SQL injections) are typically program inputs
of a specific data type (e.g., integer, string) whereas the
exploits in our system are adversarial smart contracts that
faithfully model the execution environment (storage, gas, etc.)
of the EVM. Second, Keccak-256 hash is ubiquitous in smart
contract for accessing addresses in memory or storage. As
shown in Section VII-B0a, basic symbolic execution will fail
to resolve the Keccak-256 hash, resulting in poor coverage. To
address this problem, the teEther [16] system proposed a novel
algorithm to infer the memory addresses encoded as Keccak-
256 hash. Unlike teEther, our system directly synthesizes
function calls that manipulate the memory and storage thus
avoids expensive computation to resolve the hash values. We
could not directly compare SMARTSCOPY with teEther as
its tools and benchmarks are not publicly available. Similar
to SMARTSCOPY, CONTRACTFUZZER [13] also generates
exploits for a limited class of vulnerabilities based on the
ABI specifications of smart contracts. However, as shown in
Section VII-C, since CONTRACTFUZZER is completely based
on random input generation, it is an order of magnitude slower
than SMARTSCOPY.
IX. CONCLUSION
We presented SMARTSCOPY, a tool for automatic synthesis
of adversarial contracts that exploit the vulnerability of a
victim smart contract under test. To make synthesis tractable,
we introduced summary-based symbolic evaluation, which
significantly reduces the number of paths that our tool needs
to explore while maintaining the precision of the vulnerability
query. Building on the summary-based symbolic evaluation,
SMARTSCOPY further introduces optimizations that enable it
to partition the synthesis search space for parallel exploration,
and to prune infeasible attack candidates earlier. We encoded
common vulnerabilities of smart contracts in our query lan-
guage, and evaluated SMARTSCOPY on the entire data set
from etherscan with >25K smart contracts. As shown in our
experimental evaluation, SMARTSCOPY significantly outper-
forms state-of-the-art smart contract analyzers in terms of pre-
cision, soundness, and execution time. Moreover, running on
recent smart contracts, SMARTSCOPY uncovers 20 previously
unknown instances with the BatchOverflow vulnerability and
none of the existing tool can precisely spot the vulnerability.
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